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A NINTH AMENDMENT FOR TODAY'S
CONSTITUTION
RANDY E. BARNEr
On the first day of his Supreme Court confirmation testimony, Robert Bork
described teaching a constitutional theory seminar at Yale Law School in which
he tried to justify what he called "a general right of freedom"' from the various
provisions of the Constitution. He recalled that Alexander Bickel, with whom
he taught the course, "fought me every step of the way; said it was not possible.
At the end of six or seven years, I decided he was right." 2 The next day, Bork
testified:
I do not think you can use the Ninth Amendment unless you know
something of what it means. For example, if you had an amendment
that says 'Congress shall make no' and then there is an ink blot and
you cannot read the rest of it and that is the only copy you have, I do
not think the court can make up what might be under the ink blot if
you cannot read it?
In taking these two positions, former Judge Bork was, unfortunately, well
within the mainstream of constitutional thought. For two hundred years the
Supreme Court of the United States has never seriously considered a general
constitutional right to liberty; at the same time it has, with few exceptions,
treated the Ninth Amendment as though it were an ink blot. I suggest that the
failure to find a "general right of freedom" in the Constitution is connected to
a general inability to understand the Ninth Amendment's declaration that: "The
enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be construed to deny
or disparage others retained by the people.""
* Norman and Edna Freehling Scholar and Professor of Law, Illinois Institute of Technology,
Chicago-Kent College of Law. This article is adopted from a lecture given at the Valparaiso
University School of Law on November 16, 1991. It will also appear in AFTER 200 YEARS: THE
BILL OF RIGHTS IN MODERN AMERICA (David Bodenhamer & James W. Ely Jr. eds., forthcoming
1992).
1. i NOMINATION OF ROBERT H. BORK TO BE ASSOCIATE JUSTICE OF THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE UNITED STATES: HEARINGS BEFORE THE SENATE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY 117 (1989)
(testimony of Robert Bork)[hereinafter NOMINATION HEARINGS].
2. Id.
3. Id. at 249.
4. U.S. CoNsT. amend. IX.
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The bicentennial of the ratification of the Bill of Rights-including the
Ninth Amendment-is an appropriate time to consider the important role that the
Ninth Amendment can play in protecting our liberties under the Constitution.
Indeed, in this essay I shall explain how an interpretation ignoring the Ninth
Amendment makes the Constitution look entirely different from one that takes
the Ninth Amendment seriously. Any understanding of how the Ninth
Amendment can work harmoniously with the rest of the Constitution, however,
requires a brief examination of the origins of this intriguing and pregnant
passage.
THE ORIGINS OF THE NINTH AMENDMENT
The origins of the Ninth Amendment can be traced to the debate
surrounding the ratification of the Constitution. The Antifederalists, who
opposed ratification, concentrated much of their attack on the absence of a bill
of rights. Although many Antifederalists were probably more concerned with
defeating the Constitution than with obtaining a bill of rights, they repeatedly
pressed this charge because it struck a responsive cord with the people. The
Federalists who supported ratification, such as Alexander Hamilton and James
Wilson, gave two answers to this complaint.
First, they said that a bill of rights was unnecessary. Because the federal
government was one of enumerated and limited powers, it would have no power
to violate the rights of the people. "Why, for instance," asked Hamilton,
"should it be said that the liberty of the press shall not be restrained when no
power is given by which restrictions may be imposed?"' Second, they argued
that a bill of rights would be dangerous. Enumerating any rights might suggest
to later interpreters of the Constitution that the rights not specified had been
surrendered. An enumeration of rights could thereby lead to an unwarranted
expansion of federal power and a corresponding erosion of individual rights.
Neither argument against a bill of rights carried the day. Antifederalists
responded tellingly by turning these Federalist arguments against the Constitution
itself. They noted that the Constitution already enumerated some of the rights
of the people-such as the protections against ex post facto laws and bills of
attainder in Article I, Section 9, and the right to a jury trial in criminal cases in
Article III, Section 2. If an incomplete enumeration was dangerous as the
Federalists had so strenuously argued, then the severely incomplete list of rights
already in the Constitution was dangerous indeed. No further harm could be
done by expanding the list.
5. THE FEDERAuST No. 84, at 631 (Alexander Hamilton) (John Hamilton ed., 1873).
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When it became clear that the Constitution was headed for defeat, the
Federalists turned the political tide by promising to support a bill of rights after
ratification. Several state conventions accompanied their ratification of the
Constitution with lengthy lists of rights and other provisions they wanted added
at the first opportunity. By this maneuver, the proponents of the Constitution
deprived the Antifederalists of their principal argument against ratification.
However, getting Congress to consider a bill of rights turned out to be no
easy feat. The congressional record shows Representative James Madison
repeatedly urging the House to take up the matter only to be told by various
congressmen that enacting the first tax bill was far more important than enacting
a bill of rights. Eventually, in a lengthy and revealing speech, Madison
proposed a series of amendments to the Constitution. He explained that a bill
of rights was needed, not only to quiet the fears and suspicions of those who still
doubted the new Constitution and to induce those states who had not ratified the
Constitution to do so, but also to better protect the liberties of the people. As
Madison observed:
If they are incorporated into the constitution, independent tribunals of
justice will consider themselves in a peculiar manner the guardians of
those rights; they will be an impenetrable bulwark against every
assumption of power in the legislative or executive; they will naturally
be led to resist every encroachment upon rights expressly stipulated for
in the constitution by the declaration of rights
In his speech, Madison took up the Federalist argument he himself had made
during the ratification debates that any effort to enumerate rights would be
dangerous:
It has been objected also against a bill of rights, that, by
enumerating particular exceptions to the grant of power, it would
disparage those rights which were not placed in the enumeration; and
it might follow, by implication, that those rights which were not
singled out, were intended to be assigned into the hands of the General
Government, and were consequently insecure. This is one of the most
plausible arguments I have ever heard urged against the admission of
a bill of rights into this system; but, I conceive, that it may be guarded
against. I have attempted it, as gentlemen may see by turning to the
last clause of the fourth resolution.7
6. 1 ANNALS OF CONo. 457 (Joseph Gales & William Seaton eds., 1834) (statement of Rep.
Madison).
7. Id. at 456.
1991]
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The passage Madison referred to was the precursor of the Ninth Amendment
which read as follows:
The exceptions here or elsewhere in the constitution, made in
favor of particular rights, shall not be so construed as to diminish the
just importance of other rights retained by the people, or as to enlarge
the powers delegated by the constitution; but either as actual
limitations of such powers, or as inserted merely for greater caution."
Madison's proposals were referred to a Select Committee of the House which
was created to consider what amendments to the Constitution might be
appropriate.
Although there is much that is controversial about the Ninth Amendment,
the story of its enactment that I have just summarized is not. In light of this
history, the original meaning of the Ninth Amendment is clear: When forming
a government the people retained rights in addition to those listed in the Bill of
Rights. But while the meaning of the Ninth Amendment may be clear, its
implications for constitutional adjudication are not. Are the unenumerated rights
judicially enforceable as the enumerated rights have come to be? If so, what
exactly are these rights? For most, the answer to the first of these questions
hinges on our ability to answer the second. As Robert Bork observed:
"Senator, if anybody shows me historical evidence about what they meant, I
would be delighted to do it. I just do not know."9 Most would agree with
Bork that, if the uncertainty surrounding their content can be resolved,
unenumerated rights should be enforceable. Otherwise, although the Congress
and the Executive could be prevented from violating enumerated rights, both
could violate the unenumerated rights with impunity. Surely this would
disparage, if not entirely deny, the unenumerated rights.
There is little question that the rights retained by the people refer, at least
in part, to what are called "natural rights"-that is, the rights people have
independent of those they are granted by a government and by which the justice
of governmental action is to be judged. Despite their many differences, the
Framers of the Constitution shared a common belief that although the people
may delegate certain powers to their agents in government, they still retain their
natural rights. This belief is illustrated by one provision of a recently
discovered draft of a bill of rights written by Representative Roger Sherman,
who served with Madison on the House Select Committee that drafted the Bill
of Rights:
8. Id. at 452.
9. NOMINATION HEARINGS, supra note 1, at 249.
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The people have certain natural rights which are retained by them
when they enter into Society, Such are the rights of Conscience in
matters of religion; of acquiring property, and of pursuing happiness
& Safety; of Speaking, writing and publishing their Sentiments with
decency and freedom; of peaceably assembling to consult their
common good, and of applying to Government by petition or
remonstrance for redress of grievances. Of these rights therefore they
Shall not be deprived by the Government of the united States. 0
This list, which was not intended to be exhaustive, includes some rights that
were eventually enumerated in the Bill of Rights. Others, such as the rights to
acquire property and pursue happiness and safety, were left unenumerated. The
Ninth Amendment establishes that no one should conclude that, because some
powers had been delegated to government and some rights had been singled out,
the other unenumerated retained rights were, in Madison's words, "assigned into
the hands of the General Government, and were consequently insecure.""
The problem with putting the Ninth Amendment into effect today is that
many no longer appreciate the natural rights that the Constitution's Framers took
for granted. Yet if the Framers had anticipated the modem philosophical
skepticism about natural rights, they would never have settled for the few rights
that were enumerated. Fortunately, there is a practical method of interpreting
unenumerated rights that does not require us to agree on a comprehensive list
of unenumerated rights. Before considering this method, let me briefly describe
what I have elsewhere called the "originalist method" of identifying
unenumerated rights.' 2
THE ORIGINALIST METHOD AND ITS LIMrrs
To discern those unenumerated rights the Framers had in mind, we might
begin, as Robert Bork suggested, by examining the written records of the
10. See, Roger Shernman's Draft of the Bill of Rights, in THE RIGHTS RETAINED BY THE
PEOPLE: THE HISTORY AND MEANING OF THE NINTH AMENDMENT 351, app. A (Randy E. Barnett
ed., 1989) (emphasis added) [hereinafter R. BARNETr. Along the same lines, Madison had
proposed to Congress that the following be added as a prefix to the Constitution, "The Government
is instituted and ought to be exercised for the benefit of the people; which consists in the enjoyment
of life and liberty, with the right of acquiring and using property, and generally pursuing and
obtaining happiness and safety." ANNALS OF CONG., supra note 5, at 45 1.
II. Id. at 456.
12. See Randy E. Barnett, Reconceiving the Ninth Amendment, 74 CORNELL L. REv. 1, 30
(1988) [hereinafter Bamett].
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period, including the numerous rights proposed by the ratification
conventions, 3 and the theoretical writings of the Framers.'4 No ink blot
prevents us from reading these materials. I have already mentioned the right to
acquire property as one that the Framers unquestionably believed to be a natural
and inalienable right which was retained by the people when forming a
government. Freedom of conscience is another. Although a list of rights
developed by using an originalist method of interpretation may be viewed as
truncated-even from the Framers' perspective-a truncated list is better than
none.
The originalist method will hardly suffice, however. The Framers believed
it was dangerous to enumerate any rights because the rights of the people are
boundless. As James Wilson, a natural-rights theorist explained, "there are very
few who understand the whole of these rights.""' None of the classic political
writers claim to provide "a complete enumeration of rights appertaining to the
people as men and as citizens. . . . Enumerate all the rights of men! I am
sure, sirs, that no gentleman in the late Convention would have attempted such
a thing."' 6 This is the reason why Wilson and others thought any attempt to
enumerate rights would be dangerous. "In all societies," Wilson observed:
there are many powers and rights, which cannot be particularly
enumerated. A bill of rights annexed to a constitution is an
enumeration of the powers reserved. If we attempt an enumeration,
everything that is not enumerated is presumed to be given. The
consequence is, that an imperfect enumeration would throw all implied
power into the scale of government; and the rights of the people would
be rendered incomplete.' 7
It is important that we understand exactly why rights cannot exhaustively be
enumerated if we are to devise a way of protecting these retained rights without
specifically enumerating each and every one.
13. Eight of the state ratification conventions officially accompanied their ratification with
scores of amendments or revisions to the Constitution. Some of these were eventually included in
the Bill of Rights. Others were not. For these proposals see THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE
CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION, 338 (Jonathan Elliot ed., 2d ed.
1836). They have been reprinted in R. BARNETT, supra note 10, at 353-85.
14. See e.g. Wilson, Of the Natural Rights of Individuals, in 2 THE WORKS OF JAMES WILSON
307 (J.D. Andrews ed., 1896).
15. 2 J. ELLIOT, supra note 13, at 454 (remarks of James Wilson).
16. Id.
17. 2 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION 388 (Merrill
Jensen ed., 1976) (statement of James Wilson to the Pennsylvania Ratifying Convention, Nov. 28,
1787).
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Rights are unenumerable because rights define a private domain within
which persons have a right to do as they wish, provided their conduct does not
encroach upon the rightful domains of others. As long as their actions remain
within this rightful domain, other persons-including the government-should
not interfere. Because people have a right to do whatever they please within the
boundaries defined by natural rights, this means that the rights retained by the
people are limited only by their imagination and could never be completely
specified or enumerated.
This open-ended conception of rights is illustrated by a fascinating exchange
that occurred during the debate in the House over the wording of what
eventually became the First Amendment proposed by the House Select
Committee. At one juncture in the debate, Representative Theodore Sedgwick
criticized the committee's inclusion of the right of assembly on the grounds that
"it is a self-evident, unalienable right which the people possess; it is certainly
a thing that never would be called into question; it is derogatory to the dignity
of the House to descend to such minutiae. . . ." Representative Egbert
Benson replied to Sedgwick that: "The committee who framed this report
proceeded on the principle that these rights belonged to the people; they
conceived them to be inherent; and all that they meant to provide against was
their being infringed by the Government." 9 Sedgwick then responded that:
if the committee were governed by that general principle, they might
have gone into a very lengthy enumeration of rights; they might have
declared that a man should have a right to wear his hat if he pleased;
that he might get up when he pleased, and go to bed when he thought
proper.... 20
Notice that Sedgwick was not denying that one had a right to wear one's
hat or go to bed when one pleased. To the contrary, he equated these inherent
rights with the right of assembly which he characterized as "self-evident" and
"unalienable."21 Indeed, Representative John Page's reply to Sedgwick made
this explicit. "[L]et me observe to him," said Page:
that such rights have been opposed, and a man has been obliged to
pull off his hat when he appeared before the face of authority; people
have also been prevented from assembling together on their lawful
occasions, therefore it is well to guard against such stretches of
18. 1 ANNALS OF CONG., supra note 5, at 759 (statement of Rep. Sedgwick).
19. Id. at 759 (statement of Rep. Benson).
20. Id. at 759-60 (statement of Rep. Sedgwick).
21. 1 ANNALS OF CONG., supra note 5, at 759 (statement of Rep. Sedgwick).
1991]
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authority, by inserting the privilege in the declaration of rights.'
Sedgwick's point was that the Constitution should not be cluttered with a
potentially endless list of trifling rights that "would never be called in[to]
question"23 and were not "intended to be infringed. "' Sedgwick's argument
implicitly assumes that the "self-evident, unalienable," and inherent liberty rights
retained by the people are unenumerable because the human imagination is
limitless. It includes the right to wear a hat, to get up when one pleases and go
to bed when one pleases, to scratch one's nose when it itches (and even when
it doesn't), and to take a sip of Diet Coke when one is thirsty.
But this returns us to the most controversial aspect of the Ninth
Amendment: How can such unenumerable rights find legal protection without
empowering judges simply to make up whatever rights may appeal to them?
Raoul Berger, for one, has charged that any effort to protect the unenumerated
rights referred to in the Ninth Amendment would provide "a bottomless well in
which the judiciary can dip for the formation of undreamed of 'rights' in their
limitless discretion.... " The answer to this concern lies in something like
the "general right to liberty" that Robert Bork once searched for-only it is
more accurate to call it a presumption of liberty.
THE PRESUMPTION OF LIBERTY
As long as they do not violate the rights of others (as defined by the
common law of property, contract and tort), persons are presumed to be
"immune" from interference by government. This presumption means that
citizens may challenge any government action that restricts their otherwise
rightful conduct, and the burden is on the government to show that its action is
within its proper powers or scope. At the national level, the government would
bear the burden of showing that its acts were both "necessary and proper" to
accomplish an enumerated function, rather than, as now, forcing the citizen to
prove why it is he or she should be left alone. At the state level, the burden
would fall upon state government to show that legislation infringing the liberty
of its citizens was a necessary exercise of its "police power"-that is, the state's
power to protect the rights of its citizens.
Any society such as ours that purports to be based on a theory of limited
government already assumes that legislation must be a proper exercise of
government power. The presumption of liberty simply requires that when
22. Id. at 760 (statement of Rep. Page).
23. Id. at 759 (statement of Rep. Sedgwick).
24. Id. at 760 (statement of Rep. Sedgwick).
25. Raoul Berger, The Mnth Amendment, 66 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 2 (1980).
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legislation or executive actions encroach upon the liberties of the people, they
may be challenged on the grounds that they lack the requisite justification. And
a neutral magistrate must decide the dispute. As Madison observed in The
Federalist No. 10:
No man is allowed to be the judge in his own cause, because his
interest would certainly bias his judgment, and, not improbably,
corrupt his integrity. With equal, nay, with greater reason, a body of
men are unfit to be both judges and parties at the same time; yet what
are many of the most important acts of legislation but so many judicial
determinations, not indeed concerning the rights of single persons, but
concerning the rights of large bodies of citizens? and what are the
different classes of legislators but advocates and parties to the causes
which they determine? .... .. Justice ought to hold the balance
between them.'
When legislation encroaches upon the liberties of the people, only review by an
impartial judiciary can ensure that the rights of citizens are protected and that
justice holds the balance between the legislature or executive and the people.
Lest anyone think this point is obvious let me hasten to note that today the
presumption used by the Supreme Court is precisely the reverse. According to
what the Court calls the "presumption of constitutionality," legislation will be
upheld if any "rational basis" for its passage can be imagined, unless it violates
a "fundamental" right-and liberty has not been deemed by the Court to be a
fundamental right. As the Court stated in United States v. Carolene Products
Co.:' "There may be a narrower scope for operation of the presumption of
constitutionality when legislation appears on its face to be within a specific
prohibition of the Constitution, such as those of the first ten amendments, which
are deemed equally specific when held to be embraced within the Fourteenth...
" In other words, the enumerated rights may narrow the presumption of
constitutionality, but one of the unenumerated rights retained by the people will
have no such power-limiting effect.
While the presumption of liberty is not the only implication of the Ninth
Amendment, it provides a practical and powerful method of protecting
unenumerated rights. As lawyers well know, the outcome of legal disputes is
26. THE FEDERAL.ST No. 10, at 107 (James Madison) (John Hamilton ed., 1873) (emphasis
added).
27. 304 U.S. 144 (1938).
28. Id. at 152 n.4. In this case, the Court also suggested that the presumption may be rebutted
by showing that discrete and insular minorities are adversely affected or that the political process
is being impeded.
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often determined by the burden of proof. For example, the First Amendment
has been held to impose a serious burden on the government to justify any of its
actions that restrict the natural right of free speech. In countless cases, this
"presumption of free speech" has effectively protected this retained but
enumerated right. The Ninth Amendment simply extends the same protective
presumption to all other exercises of liberty.
Although originally the Ninth Amendment, like the rest of the Bill of
Rights, was most likely intended by the Framers to be enforced only against the
federal government, this was not because it was thought that the people had
surrendered all their rights to state governments-a suggestion belied by the
swift incorporation into most state constitutions of provisions identical to the
Ninth Amendment. Indeed, many rights-such as the right of conscience or the
right to acquire property-were thought to be unalienable, which means that the
people could not surrender them to any government even if they wanted to.
Rather, the Congress and the federal courts originally lacked jurisdiction to
protect the retained "privileges or immunities" of citizens from abuses by their
states. As we all know, this arrangement was fundamentally changed by the
enactment of the Fourteenth Amendment after the civil war. Today, if a state
government infringes upon a right the people retained against their respective
states, there is no jurisdictional barrier preventing Federal protection of this
right.
APPLYING THE PRESUMPTION OF LmERTY TODAY
To see how a presumption of liberty might operate today, consider
Congress's power under Article I, Section 8 to "establish post offices." Having
exercised this establishment power, Congress is free under the Necessary and
Proper clause to regulate the operation of its post offices in any manner it sees
fit. However, what happens when Congress, allegedly pursuant to its postal
powers, goes beyond its power to administer its own offices and claims the
further power to establish a postal monopoly, as it has? According to the now
prevailing presumption of constitutionality, Congress would be free to establish
a monopoly unless either potential competitors or consumers of postal services
could prove that this claimed government power violates a fundamental right.
For example, competitors might allege a fundamental right to carry first class
mail, while recipients of mail could claim they had a fundamental right to send
first class mail by any means they chose. Because these rights sound trivial
rather than fundamental they are easy to disparage-almost as easy to disparage
as the trifling right to wear a hat or go to bed when one pleases. Consequently,
courts have not barred the Congress from establishing its monopoly or even
inquired very seriously as to whether such laws are truly necessary or proper.
With judges lacking a proper view of the Ninth Amendment, today the outcome
of such a lawsuit would be virtually pre-determined: the government wins and
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the citizen loses.
A presumption of liberty, however, would shift the burden of proof from
the citizen to the government. Instead of imposing the burden on the citizen to
establish the violation of a "fundamental" right, a burden would be imposed on
the government, in this case upon Congress, to show a compelling reason why
it is both necessary and proper to grant its own post office a legal monopoly.
In enacting the Constitution, the people retained their unenumerated right to
establish their own private post offices if they so chose. They neither expressly
nor impliedly surrendered this right up to the general government. The Ninth
Amendment serves as an ever-present reminder that the mere fact that such a
right is left out of the Bill of Rights ought not to suggest otherwise.
In a speech before the second House of Representatives, the author of the
Ninth Amendment, James Madison himself, used it in a strikingly similar
fashion to object to the pending bill to establish a single national bank on the
grounds that the bill was unconstitutional. His usage also helps clarify the
relationship between the Ninth Amendment's protection of the rights retained by
the people and the Tenth Amendment's injunction that: "The powers not
delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the
States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people."
Madison examined the Constitution at length to see if the power to create
such a bank could be found among any of those delegated to the government and
he concluded that "it is not possible to discover in [the Constitution] the power
to incorporate a Bank."" He then considered whether the proposed bank might
be justified under the Necessary and Proper Clause3 as a means of executing
the Borrowing Power.3 "Whatever meaning this clause may have," Madison
began, "none can be admitted, that would give unlimited discretion to Congress.
Its meaning must, according to the natural and obvious force of the terms and
the context, be limited to means necessary to the end, and incident to the nature
of the specified powers."32
Madison's argument here reflects one of the reasons he had offered for
adopting a bill of rights during his speech the year before to the first House of
Representatives in which he proposed amendments to the Constitution:
29. 1 ANNALS OF CONG., supra note 6, at 1896 (statement of Rep. Madison).
30. See U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8 ("The Congress shall have Power... To make all Laws which
shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing powers. .. ").
31. See U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8 ("The Congress shall have Power... To borrow Money on
the credit of the United States. .. ").
32. 1 ANNALS OF CONG., supra note 6, at 1898.
Ingber: The First Amendment, Intermediate Institutions and a Democratic P
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 1991
430 VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 26
It is true, the powers of the General Government are circumscribed,
they are directed to particular objects; but even if Government keeps
within those limits, it has certain discretionary powers with respect to
the means, which may admit of abuse to a certain extent ... because
in the constitution of the United States, there is a clause granting to
Congress the power to make all laws which shall be necessary and
proper for carrying into execution the powers vested in the
Government of the United States, or in any department thereof.
33
Madison contended that a bill of rights was one way to police abuses of this
lawmaking discretion.
In evaluating whether the Necessary and Proper Clause justified the claimed
power to create a national bank, Madison contrasted the requirement of necessity
with that of mere convenience or expediency. "But the proposed bank," he
said:
could not even be called necessary to the Government; at most it could
be but convenient. Its uses to the Government could be supplied by
keeping the taxes a little in advance; by loans from individuals; by the
other Banks, over which the Government would have equal command;
nay greater, as it might grant or refuse to these the privilege (a free
and irrevocable gift to the proposed Bank) of using their notes in the
Federal revenues.-'
Notice that Madison was not simply making what would now be called a
"policy" choice. Earlier in his address to the House, Madison did address the
policy issues raised by the proposal when he "began with a general review of
the advantages and disadvantages of Banks."' However, "[i]n making these
remarks on the merits of the bill, he had reserved to himself the right to deny
the authority of Congress to pass it."' Rather, in the passage I quoted,
Madison is making the constitutional argument that these other means of
accomplishing an enumerated object or end are superior precisely because they
do not entail the violation of the rights retained by the people and are therefore
to be preferred in principle. In particular, these measures do not involve the
grant of a monopoly, "which," in Madison's words, "affects the equal rights of
every citizen. "I
33. Id. at 455 (statement of Rep. Madison).
34. Id. at 1901 (remarks of Rep. Madison).
35. Id. at 1894.
36. 1 ANNALS OF CONO., supra note 6, at 1896.
37. Id. at 1900 (emphasis added).
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 26, No. 1 [1991], Art. 11
https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol26/iss1/11
1991] FOR TODAY'S CONSTITUTION 431
In other words, there is a difference in principle between these alternative
means; just as there is a difference in principle, not merely policy, between
drafting citizens and paying volunteers as the means of exercising the
congressional power to "raise and support Armies ... ."I Although Article
I, Section 8 delegates this power to Congress, when it chooses a means of
accomplishing this end that intrudes upon the liberties of the people, as a
military draft does, then it must justify this rights infringement by showing that
its acts are genuinely necessary and proper. The government must show that it
cannot accomplish its constitutionally delegated end by means that do not
trespass upon the rights retained by the people.
Finally, in his bank speech Madison also questioned the proposed exercise
of the Necessary and Proper Clause on the grounds that the power claimed was
highly remote from any enumerated power. "Mark the reasoning on which the
validity of the bill depends," he observes:
To borrow money is made the end, and the accumulation of capitals
implied as the means. The accumulation of capitals is then the end,
and a Bank implied as the means. The Bank is then the end, and a
charter of incorporation, a monopoly, capital punishments, &c.,
implied as the means.
If implications, thus remote and thus multiplied, can be linked
together, a chain may be formed that will reach every object of
legislation, every object within the whole compass of political
economy.
The latitude of interpretation required by the bill is condemned
by the rule furnished by the Constitution itself3 9
As authority for this "rule" of interpretation, Madison cited the Ninth
Amendment:
The explanatory amendments proposed by Congress themselves,
at least, would be good authority with them; all these renunciations of
power proceeded on a rule of construction, excluding the latitude now
contended for. . . . He read several of the articles proposed,
remarking particularly on the Ith [the Ninth Amendment] and 12th
[the Tenth Amendment], the former, as guarding against a latitude of
interpretation; the latter, as excluding every source of power not
38. U.S. CONSr. art. 1, § 8.
39. 1 ANNALS OF CONO., supra note 6, at 1899 (statement of Rep. Madison) (emphasis added).
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within the Constitution itself.'
Thus, Madison viewed the Ninth and Tenth Amendments as playing distinct
roles. Madison viewed the Tenth Amendment ("The powers not delegated to
the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are
reserved to the States respectively, or to the people") as authority for the rule
that the Congress could only exercise a delegated power. For example, in the
illustrations I have used, Congress could not establish a post office or raise and
support armies without a delegation of power to pursue these ends. In contrast,
Madison viewed the Ninth Amendment as providing authority for a rule against
the loose construction of these powers-especially the Necessary and Proper
Clause-when legislation affects the rights retained by the people. As Madison
concluded in his bank speech: "In fine, if the power were in the Constitution,
the immediate exercise of it cannot be essential; if not there, the exercise of it
involves the guilt of usurpation. . . ."4'
In my examples, because a postal monopoly and a military draft infringe
upon the rightful liberties of the people, these are suspect means for pursuing
delegated ends. Those claiming that legislation restricting the rightful liberties
of the people falls under a delegated power have the burden of showing that it
is a genuinely necessary and proper exercise of such a power. As I have argued
elsewhere, constitutional rights-including unenumerated rights-operate both
as "means-constraints" and as "ends-constraints."' 2
Once the Ninth Amendment is viewed as establishing a presumption of
liberty thereby placing a burden of justification on the government, every action
of government that infringes upon the rightful liberties of the people can be
called into question. Is it really necessary that persons-particularly poor
persons-obtain licenses requiring extensive testing in such subjects as chemistry
before they may work as beauticians? Is it really necessary that government
limit the number of taxicabs it licenses so that the price of taxicab medallions
in some cities reaches $10-20,000 or even higher? Or are all these and other
similar measures really ways by which a privileged few seek to eliminate lower-
priced competition? Is it really necessary to criminalize the sale and use of
intoxicating substances, or is a "drug-free" society better achieved in ways that
do not infringe upon the liberties of the people-perhaps by the sort of education
and social pressure that is currently being used so effectively to combat the use
of nicotine in cigarettes and the abuse of alcohol. Even the current government
40. Id. at 1901. The numbering of the amendments changed because the first two amendments
proposed by Congress were not ratified by the states. At the time Madison spoke, this outcome was
not yet known.
41. Id. at 1902 (statement of Rep. Madison).
42. See Bamett, supra note 13, at 11-16.
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 26, No. 1 [1991], Art. 11
https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol26/iss1/11
1991] FOR TODAY'S CONSTITUTION 433
restrictions that limit the practice of law to those who have attended three years
of law school would not be beyond challenge and scrutiny.
None of these or any other Ninth Amendment claim can be decided in the
abstract-by which I mean without taking into account the specifics of particular
legislation and the factual context in which it is applied. What the Ninth
Amendment requires, however, is that such claims as these be evaluated when
liberty-restricting legislation is challenged by a citizen. Adopting the
presumption of liberty would make this requirement effective.
This is not to say that the government would never be able to meet its
burden. I fully expect that if a presumption of liberty is established, the courts
would find that government has met its burden far more often than they should.
We must never forget that the Supreme Court once upheld the government's
power to imprison American citizens of Japanese descent in prison camps
because of the threat to national security these citizens allegedly posed.'
Judicial review is not a panacea for protecting liberty.
Nor does the presumption of liberty establish a license to do whatever one
wishes. Liberal political theorist John Locke put the matter as follows:
But though this be a State of Liberty, yet it is not a State of License.
.. . The State of Nature has a Law of Nature to govern it, which
obliges everyone: And Reason, which is that Law, teaches all
Mankind, who will but consult it, that being all equal and independent,
no one ought to harm another in his Life, Health, Liberty, or
Possessions.'
As I mentioned earlier, justice, which is to say rights, defines the boundaries
within which one may do as one wishes. According to this conception of
liberty, one cannot permissibly infringe upon the rightful domains of others.
According to Locke, in the state of nature, "all Men may be restrained from
invading others Rights, and from doing hurt to one another."4' The common
law of property, contracts, and torts has traditionally defined the extent and
nature of these boundaries. Tortious conduct is not a "rightful" exercise of
one's liberty; one has no constitutional right to commit trespass upon the land
of another. Provided that one is acting rightfully in this sense, however, a
presumption of liberty would require government to justify any interference with
such conduct.
43. Korematsu v. U.S., 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
44. JOHN LOCKE, Two TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT 288-89 (Peter Laden ed., 1967) (2d ed.
1970).
45. Id. at 289.
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Finally, a presumption of liberty does not authorize judges to usurp either
legislative or executive functions. Protecting the rights of individuals and
associations to act or refrain from acting in ways that do not violate the
common-law rights of others, neither empowers judges to create new "positive
rights" nor authorizes them to enact taxes to pay for such rights. Judges may
only strike down offending legislation-and judicial negation is not legislation.
Assuming they have the political will, the other branches of government have
more than enough power to defend themselves from judicial encroachment.
CONCLUSION: THE EQUAL PROTECTION OF LIBERTIES AND THE FUTURE OF
THE NINTH AMENDMENT
What is the future of the Ninth Amendment? In law, as in most areas of
life, betting that the future is going to be pretty much like the past is usually the
safest wager. If this turns out to be true, then the Ninth Amendment, which has
been so tragically neglected by the Supreme Court over the past two centuries,
is doomed to remain in it state of desuetude. But while betting against change
may be the most conservative gamble, it is often a losing one. The past twenty
years has witnessed a trend in the direction of a revived Ninth Amendment. In
particular, a renewed interest in the views of the Framers of the Constitution and
of the Civil War amendments has caused those who favor an expansive judicial
protection of fundamental rights to focus attention on the original intent of the
Ninth Amendment. Moreover, the Framers' concept of natural rights is no
longer in disrepute. If the Senate confirmation hearings of Judge Robert Bork
to the Supreme Court of the United States was a watershed development in the
legitimation of the Ninth Amendment, the confirmation hearings of Justice
Clarence Thomas may prove to have a similar effect on the legitimacy of natural
rights.46
Although, with the addition of Justices Scalia, Kennedy, Souter, and
Thomas to the Supreme Court and the elevation of William Rehnquist to Chief
Justice, "conservatives" appear now to be in firm control of the Court, the type
of "judicial conservatism" that will eventually emerge in the third century of the
Bill of Rights is still very much in doubt. Will it be a majoritarian conservatism
of judicial deference to majority will as expressed in legislation? Or will it be
a more libertarian conservatism that views the courts as neutral magistrates
46. History may well mark the turning point for natural rights theory in the United States to
be Senate Judiciary Committee Chairman Joseph Biden's opening round of questioning during the
Thomas confirmation hearings in which he openly embraced natural rights and stated that the issue
for him was which version of natural rights the nominee favored.
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 26, No. 1 [1991], Art. 11
https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol26/iss1/11
1991] FOR TODAY'S CONSTITUTION 435
empowered to protect the individual from the government? Which of these
conservatisms comes eventually to prevail will depend, perhaps in principal part,
upon whether a majority of the Court can be persuaded to take James Madison's
Ninth Amendment and its pivotal role in constitutional interpretation to heart.
Which judicial philosophy prevails will also depend upon whether
proponents of the Ninth Amendment will take a more principled stance towards
so-called fundamental liberties. The liberties each person holds "fundamental"
are imperiled when advocates of some liberties they hold dear are more than
willing to deny or disparage the liberties thought fundamental by others. For
example, many if not most of those favoring a fundamental right of privacy that
includes a woman's "right to chose" to terminate a pregnancy offer no support
to and indeed would actively oppose those who favor a fundamental "right to
choose" to engage in a lawful occupation-such as driving a taxi cab-free from
protectionist economic regulations. And few seem at all concerned with the
fundamental "right to choose" whether or not to own a gun or to alter one's
mental state by means of substances as alcohol, nicotine, peyote, or heroin.
According to this discriminatory methodology, if some choices are deemed
fundamental, other rights-respecting choices are vilified and ridiculed.
However, by picking and choosing among all the unenumerable liberties of
the people to determine which choices are fundamental and which are not, those
who would limit judicial protection to those liberties deemed fundamental are
putting courts in the difficult position of establishing a hierarchy of liberties.
This contributes to the longstanding fear that any revival of the Ninth
Amendment would place courts in the role of a "super-legislature" usurping the
functions of other branches. When interpreted as justifying a presumption of
liberty, however, I think this fear of the Ninth Amendment is unfounded
precisely because such a presumption provides a principled defense of all
liberties of the people and removes the courts from having to decide which
liberty is truly fundamental and which is not.
In sum, adopting the presumption of liberty would enable us finally to
acknowledge the Ninth Amendment's unique constitutional function by resisting
legislative or executive usurpation of the unenumerated rights "retained by the
people" while, at the same time, avoiding unfettered judicial discretion. The
presumption of liberty would permit us finally to remove the ink blot from the
Ninth Amendment. I can think of no better way to celebrate its two hundredth
birthday.
47. For the record, I emphatically refuse to equate libertarianism and conservatism.
Nonetheless, it is true that both modem *conservatives" and "liberals" can be more or less
"libertarian" and more or less "majoritarian." I maintain that we cannot analyze the present or
future course of the Court without taking into account these decidedly different strains of judicial
philosophy.
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